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1 Musical Aspects of Auditory Imagery 
Andrea R. Halpern 
Bucknell University 
Convincing people that they experience auditory imagery for music is not diffi­
cult. When I tell people that I study auditory imagery , be they psychologists, 
musicians, neither, or both, they often ask me how they can stop tunes from 
running through their head. Unfortunately, I have no expert answer for them. But 
anyone who has experienced such an annoyance will agree that auditory imagery, 
or "sounds in the head," is at least as vivid as the "pictures in the head" of visual 
imagery. This vividness is also illustrated by an item on an auditory imagery 
questionnaire that I employed in one of the studies described later on. It asked 
respondents to imagine the sound of fingernails scraping a chalkboard and to rate 
the image for vividness. You may not be surprised that many people reacted with 
shivers and remonstrations, as if I had actually done the obnoxious deed. 
Despite this strong subjective experience, very little research has explored the 
nature of auditory imagery. From the subjective point of view, most people will 
agree that auditory imagery for music seems to extend in time, to have an 
identifiable tempo, and to have an identifiable pitch. The goal of my recent 
research has been to try to specify the characteristics of auditory imagery, partic­
ularly for music. The success of such an enterprise would be a valuable addition 
to two extant literatures: that in music cognition and that in visual imagery 
research. 
TESTING MUSICAL MEMORY 
People interested in music cognition have naturally been concerned with the 
primary question: How is music represented in the mind? To answer this ques-
1 
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tion, the modal technique has been to present subjects a novel snippet of music, 
and then to ask some questions about it. Because asking for recall in music 
experiments invites problems in scoring (errors of representation versus produc­
tion) and subject cooperation, typically the subject is asked to recognize or 
compare the recently presented extract with a new one. The independent variable 
is the extent to which the old and new selections are similar. For instance, if a 
listener fails to discriminate between a tune and one similar to it in contour, 
researchers conclude that the contour of both selections must have been ab­
stracted and remembered (e.g., Dowling, 1978). 
Two methodological principles are evident in this approach. One is that ob­
serving the learning of novel music is both instructive for the researcher and 
relevant to some of the subject's everyday musical tasks. Clearly, presenting 
experimenter-constructed music for learning confers all the usual advantages of 
experimental control. All subjects have uniform conditions for learning, and the 
characteristics of the stimuli can be precisely controlled. Also, learning and 
remembering stimulus melodies, despite their artificial construction, is in many 
ways similar to learning new music in real world situations. Simply understand­
ing a later part of a new piece often requires memory of an earlier part, as in the 
theme and variation form (Pollard-Gott, 1983). And although no one probes 
memory for the new works as concert goers leave the hall, no doubt some 
memory traces are laid down during the perfonnance, which probably could be 
assessed by implicit memory tasks. 
Underlying this way of examining music cognition is the second principle, 
which is that memory in these situations is imperfect, and we gain insight by 
examining these imperfections. This is a standard approach to studying memory 
and one that has yielded much interesting information about the schematic nature 
of memory, that is, the order of priority in memory representations when only 
some information is retained. As an example of this type of research, I composed 
melodies that varied from one another only on one musical dimension, such as 
rhythm, contour, or modality (Halpern, 1984). After learning the melodies, 
subjects tried to identify them. The error pattern revealed that tunes of different 
contours were rarely confused with each other, whereas tunes identical except for 
modality (major vs. minor) were more frequently confused, especially among 
nonmusicians. Thus I concluded that contour was a salient dimension in the 
schematic memory representation but modality was less strongly encoded. 
Thinking of music memory as schematic is probably accurate for many of the 
interactions that both trained and untrained people have with music. However, 
recently I have become interested in the nature of representation when memory 
for music is essentially perfect. Whereas it appears that the majority of work in 
music cognition has examined short-term memory, I would like to examine long­
tenn memory. By this I mean that I am interested in the way well-learned music 
is represented. People are able to remember a large repertory of music and retain 
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it for many years (Bartlett & Snelus, 1980). What kinds of codes make this 
retention possible? Clearly, proposing verbal codes in the traditional sense is 
impractical when trying to understand memory for melody (as opposed to the 
lyrics in vocal music). Even if we assume that a small minority of musicians can 
encode tunes in terms of musical structure, motor commands, or musical nota­
tion, the successful retention of music by untrained people suggests the existence 
of other types of durable codes. The explication of those codes has been the goal 
of my current program of research. 
The study of auditory imagery for music also dovetails with a second literature 
on visual imagery. Studies in visual imagery have often been concerned with the 
literal or analogue properties of visuo-spatial representations. So, for example, 
various authors have examined the size and shape of the mental visual field 
(Finke & Kosslyn, 1980), the subjective size of visual images (Kosslyn, 1978), 
the representation of depth (Pinker, 1980), and the order of construction of the 
images (Kosslyn, Cave, Provost, & von Gierke, 1988). 
Some authors have proposed that visual imagery and visual perception share 
characteristics or even a common locus in the visual system (e.g., Finke, 1985). 
Farah (1988) has documented a number of physiological similarities between 
imaging and perceiving in both intact and brain damaged people. In addition to 
the intrinsic interest of this comparison, the extent to which we can compare 
visual imagery and perception facilitates studying the former because of the 
essentially private or introspective nature of imagery. On the other hand, at least 
part of the perceptual experience, the stimulus, is public and therefore measur­
able. 
For these same reasons, the study of auditory imagery is not only interesting 
in itself, but invites fruitful comparisons with both auditory perception and visual 
imagery. The research reported here attempts to expand methods and findings 
from visual imagery research to auditory imagery, which is a comparatively 
unstudied phenomenon. Auditory and visual imagery are similar in that both are 
terms used for sometimes quite vivid quasi-perceptual experiences. However, 
intrinsic differences in the two modalities prevent a simple extension of methods 
from one to the other. The most obvious difference is that visual stimuli are 
extended in space, and we think that visual images represent that extension . 
Auditory stimuli are extended in time, and we may hypothesize that auditory 
images represent this corresponding extension. 
This extension in time rather than space requires a different approach to 
experimentation. Auditory stimuli are ephemeral and dynamic, making mental 
manipulations more reliant on short-term memory and therefore more difficult 
than in the visual domain. For example, participants in an auditory experiment 
have to use short-term memory even to keep the recognition alternatives in focal 
attention, a trivial matter in most visual situations. Thus the questions an experi­
menter can put to subjects in an auditory imagery paradigm are more constrained 
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than those in visual task . Particularly in auditory imagery for music, tasks might 
require a higher level of mu ical training for success than is desirable when the 
goal is to assess a general population. 
The issue of training i another point of difference between the two 
modalities. One attractive aspect of tudying auditory imagery for music is the 
opportunity to examine different levels of training in the subject population. For 
the mo r part, the research described here does not use subjects selected for their 
musical training. However selecting people with various training levels can help 
answer whether auditory imagery abilities are universal, or if they are correlated 
with musical tuition. 
The research described here derives from an interest in finding out to what 
extend the "tune inside the head" is a veridical experience. That is, does an 
auditory image of a tune exist in real time, with representations of tempo and 
pitch? Are the e analogue representations used only in response to an experi­
menter' instructions, or are they spontaneously generated when mental com­
parisons of tunes are required? After describing work so far accomplished, I end 
by describing some studies in progress that extend the findings to the neuropsy­
chological domain. 
Temporal Extent 
Just as the representation of spatial extension is of interest in studies of visual 
imagery, so i the extension and ordering in time important in auditory inforrna­
rion processing. Consider the difficulty of trying to imagine "Jingle BeUs" from 
the second phrase ( "O'er the fields ... ") without thinking of the first phta e of 
the song ("Dashing through ... "). 
The approach taken in the first experiment of the series in Halpern (1988a) 
was modeled on the visual scanning study by Kosslyn, Ball, and Reiser (l 978). 
In that study, subjects memorized a map of a fictional island that displayed 
features such as a beach, a hut, and a well. After subjects could accurately 
reproduce the map, Kosslyn and colleagues gave them a scanning task. As 
subjects heard the name of a map feature, they were to image the map and 
mentally focu on the feature. They then heard a second feature. If the feature 
was in fact included on the map, the task was to mentally scan to the second 
feature by imagining a little black speck moving from place to place. Subjects 
pressed a button wben they "arrived'' at the econd place. If mental canoing is 
analogous to physical scanning, then time to push the button should increase with 
real distance on the map. This is in fact what happened, but only if subjects were 
specifically in tructed to use imagery. lf not, time to an wer bore no relation to 
real distance between the features. I borrowed this technique in my initial series 
of experiments to see if temporal extent could be inferred in an auditory imagery 
task, as Kosslyn, Ball, and Reiser inferred spatial extent in Lheirs. 
In most of these studies, undergraduates unselected for musical training or 
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ability were employed, as the goal was to assess how ordinary people remember 
tunes. In the first study, lyrics to the beginning of three songs familiar to this 
population were used ("Do Re Mi," "The Star Spangled Banner," and "Hark 
the Herald Angels Sing"). These were chosen because each has the beginning or 
only syllable of a lyric falling unambiguously on odd-numbered beats. For in­
stance, beats 1, 3, and 5 for "The Star-Spangled Banner" fall on the words "oh," 
"can," and "see," respectively. In addition, each song has unique words in its 
first phrase, so that a particular lyric refers to only one place in the song. 
For each song, lyrics beginning on beats 1, 3, and 5 (variable that I refer to as 
"startpoint") were paired with lyrics 2, 4, 6, or 8 beats away ("stepsize") to 
comprise the "true" trials. In addition, a "false" trial was yoked to each "true" 
trial by replacing the second lyric in the pair by one resembling the true lyric. 
Subjects were first asked about their familiarity with the songs and lyrics, so 
that we could be sure that participants were using long-term memory representa­
tions. Each trial consisted of presenting the name of one of the three songs, 
followed one second later by the first lyric of a pair and, after 750 msec, the 
second lyric. In the imagery condition, subjects were instructed to first "men­
tally focus" on the first lyric. Then they decided if the second lyric was a lyric in 
the song. If it wasn't, they were to press the False button on a response board as 
quickly and accurately as possible. If the second lyric was indeed in the song, 
subjects followed imagery instructions to "start" at the first lyric and "mentally 
play" the song until they "arrived" at the second lyric and pressed the True 
button. In the nonimagery condition, subjects were simply told to mentally focus 
on the first lyric, and when the second lyric appeared, to indicate whether it was 
or was not an actual song lyric by pressing the appropriate button. 
Figure 1.1 shows the mean reaction time for each correct "true" trial. Note 
the main effect of group: The imagery group took longer to respond than the non­
imagery group. This suggests that the imagery instructions caused that group to 
act differently from the non-imagery group, and is consistent with findings in the 
visual imagery literature that images take some time to form (Kosslyn, Cave, 
Provost, & von Gierke, 1988). As predicted, reaction time increased with step­
size. The increase had both linear and quadratic components, as it was positively 
accelerated with larger stepsizes. The fact that both groups showed the increase 
with stepsize implies that non-imagery subjects may also use analogue represen­
tations even when not so instructed. 
One other difference between the two groups was that reaction time increased 
with startpoint, but only under imagery instructions. This implies that imagery 
subjects are slower to process parts of the song that occur farther from the 
beginning, as if they need to "run through" the initial part of the song before 
beginning the trial. Note that even the imagery instructions made no mention of 
starting the song from the beginning. 
Thus, with or without imagery instructions, reaction time increased with 
increasing number of beats in the real stimulus song. This suggests that subjects 
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FIG. 1.1. Mean reaction time as a function of startpoint, stepsize, and 
instruction group in the scanning experiment. Reprinted from Halpern 
(1988a). 
were operating on a representation of the song in real time. The lack of a 
startpoint effect in the non-imagery group may mean that subjects do not always 
need to process the beginning of a song when mental work is required on a 
middle portion of it. However, I should also note that of the many versions and 
replications of this task conducted at about the same time, only in this instance 
did the lartpoint effect fail to obtain. One i compelled then to consider this lack 
of an effect an exception. 
In subsequent versions of the task, we showed that the results did not depend 
on auditory imagery ability, as assessed by the questionnaire mentioned earlier 
(the usual pattern with visual imagery), nor on the extent of reported imagery use 
during the experiment. And finally, subject claimed to be unaware of the manip­
ulations and hypothesis of the experiment, so that we are fairly confident that the 
data were not the result of mere subject cooperation. 
However, the results in the scanning task do not imply a specifically musical 
representation. Subject could have perfonned the task by looking up a list of the 
correct lyrics, or perhaps by using a list of vi ual repre entations of lyric or 
notes. The next experiment probed specifica!]y for a mu ical representation of 
the songs by using a mental pitch comparison task. The pitch comparison task 
requires subjects to process the first lyric in each trial, whereas previously, a 
subject could produce the correct answer without following instructions to "men­
tally focus" on the first lyric. 
This type of task is modeled on another variety of visual imagery task, where 
imagery effects are elicited without necessarily giving imagery instructions. For 
instance, in the well-known mental rotation tasks first devised by Roger Shepard 
and colleagues, subjects are asked whether one object is the same as or different 
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1. MUSICAL ASPECTS OF AUDITORY IMAGERY 7 
from another identical object that has been transformed by a rotation in the 
picture plane or depth (Shepard & Metzler, 1971). Subjects are not explicitly told 
about the transformations nor directed to use imagery. Nevertheless, the time 
taken to answer varies directly with the degree of rotation that separates the two 
objects in the real world. This finding has been interpreted as evidence for the 
analogue nature of visual imagery: imagining point A and then point C requires 
real-time processing of any intermediate points B. 
Devising an auditory equivalent of mental rotation illustrates the difficulty, 
referred to in the Introduction, of traversing the two modalities. In the visual 
task, the two objects to be compared can be presented simultaneously on a 
screen, thus removing any memory load. Presenting two sounds simultaneously 
simply results in a confusing percept, or a third percept emerging from the two 
components, such as a major chord emerging from presentation of a C, E, and G 
sounded together. An additional problem results from the difficulty in labeling 
parts of an auditory representation. In the Kosslyn, Ball, and Reiser (1978) 
experiment, parts of the map were labeled with the feature name. For music, a 
convenient way to label is to use only songs (not instrumental music) and allow 
the lyrics to serve as labels for the notes. This unfortunately confines us to using 
sung music, which puts us at risk for actually testing text memory. But at least 
the pitch comparison task requires that the lyrics be used only indirectly as a 
means of locating the notes that are being compared. 
Eight songs were selected that fulfilled the requirements of familiarity and 
beat placement noted in the previous experiment. For each of the 12 trial types 
(three startpoints and four stepsizes), the two component lyrics represented dif­
ferent pitches in the actual song. For instance, in "The Star-Spangled Banner" 
the note on the word "by" (beat 7) is higher in pitch than the note on the word 
"can" (beat 3). 
Familiarization of the songs and lyrics, plus a demonstration of what "higher" 
and "lower" in pitch means, preceded the experiment. For each trial, subjects 
saw a song title, followed by the first lyric. The first lyric was always the closer 
of the two lyrics to the beginning of the song. After 500 msec, the second lyric 
appeared. To see whether imagery effects depended on instructions in this task, 
two groups were used. Subjects in the imagery group were told to "begin with 
the first lyric and play through the song in your mind until you reach the second 
lyric." Both groups were told to compare the pitch of lyric 2 with that of lyric 1 ,  
and press either the "higher" or  "lower" button on a response board. 
Although all subjects claimed to understand the task, this experiment differed 
dramatically from the previous one in its difficulty. Data from seven of 40 
subjects were discarded because of error rates of 40% or over. The mean error 
rate of the remaining subjects was 24%, compared to 6% for the previous 
experiment. A post hoc division of the subjects by a median split of their years of 
training (mdn = 5.5 years) showed only that musicians were more accurate than 
nonmusicians (19% vs. 29% errors), but this factor did not interact with any 
8 HALPERN 
others. As error rates in tasks like mental rotation are typically quite low, we see 
here an example of what I believe is the inherent higher level of difficulty in 
auditory imagery experiments. No differences in speed were found between 
musicians and nonmusicians. 
Considering reaction time (RT) , the type of instruction had absolutely no 
effect on the results, and so Fig. I. 2 shows data combined over groups in the left­
hand panel. Reaction time increased as a function of both stepsize and startpoint, 
even more clearly than before. This effect is particularly compelling when one 
considers that only 76% of the data could be analyzed. The startpoint effect is 
quite clear for stepsizes 4, 6, and 8, but disappears at stepsize 2. This was also 
evident in Fig. I. I for the previous experiment. One explanation is that lyrics 
only two beats away from one another may be part of the same syntactic structure 
or musical motive. The two components may be so associated that the task may 
not require any time-consuming serial processing. 
Turning now to the error pattern shown in the right-hand panel, once again 
instruction type made no difference in results, so the data are combined over 
groups. Error rate did change as a function of stepsize, but it only increased for 
Stepsizes 4 through 8. There was no effect of startpoint. 
There was a Startpoint by Stepsize interaction, which appeared to show a 
decrease of errors at Stepsize 4. Post-hoc inspection of trials showed that the 
average pitch ,w�aration, in semitones, was largest for trials of stepsize 4. Per­
haps this could explain the lower error rate if we assumed a symbolic distance 
effect. In auditory perception, tones close to one another in pitch are maximally 
interfering with one another (Dewar, Cuddy, & Mewhort, 1977). Thus a second-
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FIG. 1.2. Mean reaction time and error rate as a function of startpoint 
and stepsize in the mental pitch comparison task. Collapsed across 
instruction groups. Reprinted from Halpern, (1988a). 
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1. MUSICAL ASPECTS OF AUDITORY IMAGERY 9 
ary analysis examined whether tones close together in pitch would be more 
difficult to compare mentally. In fact, error rates did decrease with increasing 
pitch separation, from 26% for pitch separations of 1 or 2 semitones, to 11 % for 
pitch separations of 9 or 10 semitones. However, this was a weak relationship, as 
only the low 11 % error rate was statistically different from the other rates by a 
Newman-Keul's test. 
Because the pitch separation factor in the above experiment was added post­
hoc, the next study in the series probed specifically for a symbolic distance effect 
in mental pitch comparison. In order to keep the stimulus set at a reasonable 
size and still fulfill the strict stimulus constraints necessary in all these studies, 
only stepsizes 4, 6, and 8 were used; and a new factor of pitch separation was 
added: 1 or 2 semitones, 3 or 4 semitones, 5 or 6 semitones, and 7 or 8 
semitones. Startpoint was dropped as a formal factor (though startpoint was 
balanced over stepsize and pitch separation insofar as it was possible). Because 
imagery instructions did not interact with any factors in the previous experiment, 
only one instruction group was included, which did not receive imagery instruc­
tions. 
Data from 2 of 20 subjects with error rates over 40% were discarded; the mean 
error rate of the remaining subjects was 22%. The usual stepsize effect obtained 
here in reaction times: They increased significantly from Stepsize 4 (4,787 msec) 
to Stepsize 6 (5,974 msec) to Stepsize 8 (6,486 msec). Means for the pitch 
separation categories appeared to be ordered in the predicted direction: They 
decreased monotonically from the smallest (5,910 msec) to the largest (5,400 
msec) categories. However, this decrease was not statistically significant. 
Mean error rates for the smallest to the largest pitch separation categories 
were 31%, 21%, 15% and 21%, respectively. These differed from one another, 
but a Newman-Keuls test revealed that only the 31 % error rate for the closest 
pitch separation was statistically different from the other three. 
We see then that the predicted effect of pitch separation was modestly sup­
ported, especially for error rates. One inevitable confound when using natu­
ralistic materials is the inability to balance song over all the other factors. In the 
first experiment in the series, song was completely balanced over the other 
factors, but this confined us to using only three songs. In that study, there was a 
main effect of song and one interaction involving song, which fortunately did not 
prevent the emergence of the more interesting effects. Nevertheless, without 
balancing for song, weak effects like pitch separation may be obscured. A natural 
extension of this work would be to compose experimental materials where all the 
factors are neatly balanced. The challenge would be to show that participants can 
learn novel music and words as well as they know "Rudolph the Red-Nosed 
Reindeer," so that we can legitimately claim that we are still studying auditory 
imagery for well-known music. 
One final unpublished study in the series examined whether the stepsize effect 
was merely an artifact of using serially-structured songs as stimuli. In this study, 
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lyrics were either presented in the order of appearance in the song ("oh" fol­
lowed by "dawn's" in "The Star Spangled Banner"), or in the reverse order. The 
mental pitch comparison task was run without imagery instructions. The hypoth­
esis was that the reverse condition would prevent people from simply scanning 
the song in a serial fashion, leading to a slow and flat reaction time function with 
stepsize. This is in fact what happened. The reverse condition was slower than 
the forward condition, and reaction time did not vary as a function of stepsize 
with reverse presentation (the usual stepsize function obtained in the forward 
condition). 
Comparing the two types of experiments described in this section, we see that 
changing the task so that a musical judgment is required considerably increased 
the difficulty level but did not substantially change the reaction time patterns 
from the scanning experiments. In this second task, reaction times increased with 
greater distance between the to-be-judged notes and also increased with the 
starting point of the first lyric, suggesting that intermediate notes were being 
processed, regardless of the instructions given to the subjects. Perhaps this more 
difficult task is almost impossible unless an imagery representation is employed. 
The apparent inevitability of this strategy is even more interesting considering 
that in actual pitch comparison tasks, intervening tones can have a large disrup­
tive effect (Deutsch, 1970, 1972). Blackbum (cited in Dowling & Harwood, 
1986) found the disruption even when the target tone was imagined. Efficient 
performance on a mental pitch comparison task ought to include bypassing the 
intervening tones in memory. 
Also interesting is the weaker propensity to access an auditory image from its 
beginning regardless of what part of the representation is being probed . Again, 
efficient performance on the tasks ought to include being able to minimize short­
term memory load by accessing the representation at the most appropriate place. 
Taken altogether, the results of these experiments begin to support the claim 
that auditory imagery is not only a strong subjective experience (subjects never 
objected to carrying out auditory imagery tasks), but is also at least partly 
quantifiable. People indeed behave as if they were running songs through their 
heads. That is, the evidence seems to point towards a representation that codes 
extension in time, that unfolds in real time, that has strong links between adja­
cent elements, and that is unidirectionally ordered. 
This should not be taken as a claim that serial processing is always obligatory. 
Thus I don't claim that we need to mentally play the first three movements of 
Beethoven's Ninth Symphony in order to think about the final "Ode to Joy" 
movement. It is very likely that hierarchical representations for music also exist 
that link motives to phrases to sections to movements. In the visual domain, 
researchers have proposed that these two types of representation coexist in our 
knowledge about maps. We have already seen Kosslyn's (Kosslyn, Ball, & 
Reiser, 1978) evidence that we can represent maps in analogue fashion. But 
others (Stevens & Coupe, 1978; Tversky, 1981) have shown that we encode maps 
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symbolically as well. For instance, it is hard to convince people that Reno, 
Nevada, is west of Los Angeles, California, because we have encoded California 
as being west of Nevada on our simplified symbolic internal map of the United 
States. Clearly we have much propositional knowledge about tunes, and could 
answer many questions about "The Star-Spangled Banner" without activating an 
analogue image (composer, genre, nationality, emotion conveyed). But when 
answering questions about literal aspects of the music or words, imagery pro­
cessing is apparently the strategy of choice. 
Imagined Tempo 
If a tune is extended in time, we may next ask whether the tempo, or the speed of 
that extension, is also represented in a consistent way. At least two types of 
anecdotal observations suggests that this is so. First, although people may be­
lieve that a synchronized musical performance requires the presence of a conduc­
tor, ensembles can function without a conductor at all. Ensembles such as rock 
bands, chamber choirs, string quartets, and church congregations may designate 
one member to begin and end pieces but otherwise operate without formal 
leadership. In order to synchronize their performances, members of musical 
groups must have some representation of the tempo of the piece in question. 
Second, people report anecdotally that their auditory images seem to have a 
specific tempo associated with them. 
Clearly, representation of the tempo is hard to account for by using symbolic 
verbal codes. Perhaps tempo is represented literally in the auditory image. The 
question asked in the next studies was whether people represent a constant or 
preferred tempo of a tune when they claim to be imaging it. In one attempt to 
answer this question, Clynes and Walker (1982) had musicians tap their finger to 
imagined music that had been extensively studied in notated form (where tempo 
is specified by the composer), and found a very stable tapping rate compared to 
tapping without imagined music. Interestingly, they also found that most of the 
musicians imagined the tempo more slowly than when they actually played the 
music on the piano . 
We may ask whether ordinary people h�ve an experience of mental tempo 
when recalling familiar tunes that are known to subjects from many contexts and 
in many versions, and thus unlikely to have one tempo associated with them. In 
order to test the idea that tempo is consistently represented, we have to test 
several stronger hypotheses: that preferred tempo will be similar whether listen­
ing or imagining music, and that preferred tempos will be stable across time. 
Given that subjects show some stability in their selected tempos, we can see if 
constraints on the representation exist by asking people to mentally transform 
tempos until they reach upper and lower bounds. 
The first study in the series (Halpern, 1988b) tested whether subjects pre­
ferred a particular tempo for familiar songs, both when the songs were actually 
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heard and when they were merely imagined. The 19 timulus song were similar 
to those I u ed previously. Examples are "Do Re Mi," "Happy Birthday," and 
"Yesterday.' Thu , the represented tempo should not be tied to a memory for any 
particular version, a might be the case with a current rock tune heard on one 
recording or a symphony, where tempo is u ually notated. 
Even more than in the previous studies, it was important that the experimenter 
and the subject agreed on the placement of beat to the lyrics. Therefore in the 
familiarization phase subjects clapped along with the lyrics. Any clapping pat­
tern different than the intended one wa corrected by the experimenter. In the 
Perception task, participants interacted with a computer. They first heard the tune 
at a very slow tempo. The computer program allowed the listeners to change the 
tempo until the song sounded "correct" to them. 1n the Imagery task, subject 
were given a list of song titles. They were instructed to imagine the tune in their 
head and to et a metronome to coincide with the beats in the imagined tune. All 
subjects performed both tasks in counterbalanced order. 
The scattergram in Fig. 1..3 show that people used a wide range of tempos: 
70 to 140 beats per minute (bpm). The tempo ettings for the 19 songs averaged 
across subjects differed from one another in both task , meaning that people were 
differentiating among the songs. Considering all the songs as a group, the means 
and variability of the imagined and perceived tempos did not di.ffer. 
Looking at individual songs in the two tasks, and as in evident from the 
Figure, perceived and imagined tempos were positively correlated (r = .63). 
Only 3 of the 19 songs had equal tempos in the two tasks (as mea ured by taking 
the ratio of imagined to perceived tempos and testing each against the hypo­
thetical ratio of 1.00). For 7 of the songs, imagined tempos were faster than 
perceived: for 9, perceived tempos were faster than imagined, refuting Clynes 
and Walker s (1982) finding that imagined tempos are usually slower than per-
FIG. 1.3. Scatter diagram com­
paring mean perceived and 
imagined tempos for familiar 
songs. Reprinted from Halpern 
(1988b). 
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ceived. However, the average absolute value of the difference between tempo 
setting in the two tasks was small , 20 bpm, relative to the range of tempos used 
in the tasks, 40 to 208 bpm. It is interesting to note that the average perceived and 
imagined tempos were about 100 bpm, or 600 msec per beat. This figure is 
commonly cited as being a "natural" or "preferred" rate for tapping, and the rate 
at which temporal discrimination is easiest (Fraisse, 1982). 
The experiment demonstrates that the task of externalizing imagined pitch 
seemed logical to the subjects, and that imagining and perceiving tempo elicit 
quite similar results. The interesting question is whether people maintain a stable 
representation of tempo over time and repeated trials. If this strong hypothesis is 
supported, then we have evidence for the weaker position that the tempos are 
represented in the first place. 
In the next study, previously unreported, participants imagined familiar songs, 
and then tapped a finger to match the beat of the imagined tempo. The tempos 
were tape-recorded and later matched to the nearest metronome setting to the 
produced beat. By having subjects tap, instead of setting a metronome as in the 
previous setting, we hoped to eliminate any possibility that verbal codes would 
be used to remember the tempo from one observation to the next. 
Each song was presented four times for judgment: Half the songs (Same 
songs) were judged four times entirely within the first or second session; the 
other half were judged twice in one session and twice again two to five days later. 
The dependent measure was the average standard deviation of those judgments. 
Control judgments consisted of sets of four Different songs judged within or 
between sessions. This control set allowed us to determine whether people al­
ways tap at a uniform rate, perhaps due to constraints on the motor system. If
people can only produce one or a few tempos, then naturally all their judgments 
will have low variability. Separate groups of musicians and nonmusicians partici­
pated. Because nonmusicians received slightly different instructions and more 
practice, results will be reported separately. 
Instead of reporting results in units of beats per minute, each metronome 
setting was assigned a number from one to 40, to better capture the "closeness" 
of adjacent metronome settings in the analysis. As can be seen in Fig. 1.4, 
tempos for musicians were very stable both between and within sessions for 
Same songs, with standard deviations of about 1.7 metronome settings (about 6 
bpm). Also evident was that the standard deviation for groups of Different songs 
was higher than that for Same songs. This shows that the subjects provided a 
variety of tempos when judging sets of different songs . But the standard devia­
tion for Different songs remained unchanged within or between sessions. In other 
words, the range in tempo judgments among "Happy Birthday," "London 
Bridge," "White Christmas," and "Do Re Mi" was wider than that for four tries 
with "Happy Birthday," but the range remained stable within or over sessions. 
The results for the nonmusicians apparently show less of an ability to keep a 
stable tempo. As seen in Fig. 1.4, Same songs within sessions were given the 
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FIG. 1.4. Stability of imagined tempos for musicians and nonmusi­
cians; for same and different songs, both within and between ses­
sions. 
same tempo most of the time, SD = l.4 metronome settings. Nonmusicians were 
differentiating Same from Different songs within a given session, showing that 
they were sensitive to tempo stability under the easier condition. However, 
variability of settings for Same songs across the sessions was as high as the 
settings for Different songs. 
A simple conclusion that nonmusicians can't maintain a stable tempo repre­
sentation across sessions is hindered by the fact that variabilities were smaller in 
general for the nonmusicians compared to the musicians. Inspection of the data 
suggests that nonmusicians -used a smaller range of tempos throughout the ex­
periment. For example, the average difference between the slowest song ("White 
Christmas") and fastest song ("When the Saints Come Marching In") was 46 
bpm for the musicians, but only 22 bpm for the nonmusicians. This difference in 
what we might call flexibility of mental tempo also shows up in the next experi­
ment. 
The stability of tempo across sessions is then evidence that at least musicians 
represent tempo with the auditory image. In the above two experiments, partici­
pants were asked to imagine the songs at a preferred or usual tempo. To what 
extent is this a rigid representation? Is the tempo subject to transformation under 
appropriate instructions? At one extreme, we may predict that the "speed" with 
which a song is imagined is subject to the same limits as auditory perception. 
Bolton (1894) found that the subjective feeling of rhythm broke down when 
intemote intervals were shorter than 115 msec or longer than 1,580 msec. The 
fastest and slowest imaginable tempos may be of similar magnitude (or at the 
extreme metronome settings of 228 msec per beat to 1,500 msec per beat) and 
constant across song. At the other extreme, the representation of tempo may be 
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so intrinsic to the song representation that subjects would have a difficult time 
imagining tempos too far removed from the preferred ones. 
A third experiment attempted to answer these questions. Ten familiar songs 
served as stimuli, and participants were initially unselected for musical training. 
As in the first study in this series, the subjects first used the metronome to find 
the preferred tempo of the song. They then tried to imagine the song at faster and 
faster tempos until the task became too difficult, followed by imagining the song 
at slower and slower tempos (the order was reversed for half the subjects). For 
the fast/slow tasks, the subjects started with the metronome at the preferred 
tempo and moved the dial toward the fastest (208 bpm) or slowest ( 40 bpm) 
metronome setting, as appropriate. Each time the subjects changed the tempo on 
the metronome, they rated the difficulty of imagining the song at that tempo. The 
ratings were on a four point scale, where "l" signified "very easy" and "4" 
signified "very difficult". The subjects were told to record on their answer sheet 
the first metronome setting receiving a rating of "4". 
For each of the three tasks, mean tempo settings differed significantly among 
the 10 songs. The mean fastest tempo of 164 bpm and slowest tempo of 65 bpm 
did not approach the metronome limits of 208 and 40 bpm. This implies that 
subjects were discriminating among the songs and not simply choosing the 
extremes on the metronome for their answers. 
The mean preferred tempo was 109 bpm. This is significantly faster than the 
mean imagined tempo from Study 1 of 98 bpm. However, tempos in these two 
studies were strongly correlated, r = .94; that is, subjects set tempos faster but in 
a very similar ordering to the first study. 
To answer the question of whether tempo representations are labile, we can 
note that the values recorded for the slowest and fastest tempos were dependent 
on the preferred tempo. Expressing this quantitatively, significant positive cor­
relations were obtained among the different tasks here, as is obvious from Fig. 
1.5. This implies that we are not dealing with an absolute limit on the speed with 
which a tune is imagined. For instance, the mean fastest imaginable tempo for 
"When the Saints Come Marching In" was 32 bpm faster than that for "White 
Christmas." 
However, the extent of mental tempo transformation does seem to have limits 
dependent on both the song ( as shown above) and the musical background of the 
subject. When asked, most subjects agreed that at least some of the songs had 
tempo "limits," beyond which it was difficult to imagine the songs. But the four 
subjects with the most extensive musical backgrounds also were able to imagine 
the songs at the most extreme tempos. The average difference between the fast 
and slow tempos was 153 bpm for the four musicians, versus 87 bpm for 
everyone else. What aspects of musical training may have allowed the greater 
flexibility shown by the musicians in the last two studies? It is doubtful that the 
musicians had had experience with this precise task in the course of their musical 
education. They may have had experience in other sorts of msucial transforma-
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FIG. 1.5. Mean preferred, fastest, and slowest imaginable tempos for 
familiar songs. 
tions, however, such as practicing a piece slowly before. playing it up to speed. 
Also, good mu icians need to be able to adju t tempos a a conductor searches 
for the appropriate speed of an entire piece or varies the tempo within a piece. 
Conductors themselves probably find that being able to imagine the sounds of 
the orchestra from simply looking at the score to be a useful skill. Just as an 
interior decorator would value the ability to imagine the sofa in different colors in 
different locations before actually executing the plan, so would a conductor value 
being able to imagine adding or subtracting instruments to the ensemble or 
speeding up and slowing down the tempo. We may expect that conductor would 
show the most flexibility in audHory imagery ta ks, and would make an interest­
ing group to study. 
In summary, th.ese studies expand on the previous findings that temporal 
extent is represented in auditory imagery by specifying some of the charac­
teristics of the temporal aspects of images. Ordinary people can extemalize the 
"speed" of their internal images, and can differentiate among tbose tempos. To 
an appreciable extent they, and even more so mu ician , are able to replicate that 
tempo over long periods of time. These results strongly imply that tempo is 
encoded in the long-term memory representation of familiar tunes. The small 
advantage hown by musicians in maintaining that tempo may resuJt from prac­
tice in being tempo setters for a group or for themselves. Nonmusicians less often 
produce their own music in a group and singing in the shower does not require 
consistent adherence to any one tempo. 
Imagined Pitch 
Few people possess what is called absolute or "perfect" pitch, the ability to name 
a given played note or to produce a note when given its letter name ("A", "B 
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flat"). Instead, almost all musicians and many untrained people possess a reason­
ably well developed sense of relative pitch. These people can recognize the 
correctness of a tune and perhaps produce good approximations of tunes they 
have heard. They can do this because Western music is based for the most part on 
the relationships of pitches to one another. For instance, when "White Christ­
mas" is sung, the second note has to be one semitone, or 5.9% higher in 
frequency than the first note, regardless of where the tune is started. And in most 
musical contexts, the starting note of the piece is irrelevant. That is, "Happy 
Birthday" is, in all important ways, the same whether starting on a low note or a 
high note. 
Yet in spontaneous singing, people do need to choose some starting pitch. Can 
we verify the subjective impression that the imaginal representations of these 
songs have something analogous to starting pitches? The next series of studies 
(Halpern, 1989) explores whether people maintain a representation of the starting 
pitch of familiar tunes. As was the case with imagined tempo, the strategy here 
was to adopt a stronger hypothesis: that people not only associate a pitch with 
imagined music, but that this pitch is fairly stable over trials and time. Keep in 
mind that these studies never use absolute pitch subjects, and the stimuli are 
traditional tunes like Christmas carols and children's songs, which are heard in 
many different keys. 
In the first study, people hummed the starting pitch of familiar songs. We 
measured the variability of those judgments within sessions and between two 
sessions separated by 48 hours. Using the same logic as in the mental tempo 
studies, if pitch representation is stable, the variability of those judgments should 
be small and about the same whether the observations are gathered close together 
or far apart in time. 
To select the subjects, a pre-test was used that screened out anyone who was 
truly singing-disabled; that is anyone who could not hold a pitch steady enough 
for us to measure. Otherwise, musical training was not considered, except that no 
subjects participated who admitted to possessing absolute pitch. Both males and 
females participated, and a comparison of their results will be of interest in 
several of the studies. 
The procedure was as follows: Subjects were shown a list of well-known 
stimulus songs and asked to indicate familiarity. Then on each trial they were 
presented with lyrics from the first phrase of a song. They were then asked to run 
the first phrase of a song through their heads and think about the pitch of the first 
note. When they had comfortably obtained this pitch, they hummed it into a tape 
recorder, and the pitches were later transcribed into musical notation to the 
nearest semitone. Subjects could redo any trial where they felt that the produced 
pitch did not match the pitch they were imagining. 
Several measures were taken to guard against the possibility that subjects were 
using their memory of one production to influence the production of another trial 
(either to produce the same pitch for the next observation of the same song, or to 
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use relative pitch to produce a desired note for a different song). Each observa­
tion was eparated from the next observation of the same song by at least three 
intervening trials. Between each trial, a different set of interfering notes was 
played on an electronic keyboard. To prevem vocalization of anything other than 
the starting pitch subjects chewed gum (sugarles , with a choice of flavors). And 
finally, subjects were asked at the end of the study if they thought their responses 
on one trial were influenced by previous responses. No one o indicated. 
Each song was presented four times for judgment: Half the song were judged 
four times entirely within the first or second session· the other half were judged 
twice in one session and twice again 48 hrs. later. The dependent measure wa 
the average standard deviation (variability) of those judgment . Control judg­
ments consisted of sets of four Different ·ongs judged across or between es­
sions. Like in the tempo studies, this control set allowed us to determine whether 
we were testing a bunch of "Johnny One-Notes," who would naturally show 
artifactual low variability. 
As hown in Fig. 1.6 variability for judgments among the Same songs was 
low, whether between or within e sion . Variability among Different songs was 
much higher showing that ubjects were sen itive to different tarting pitches 
where appropriate. Thi too did not depend on whether the judgments were 
between or within es ions. Also note that the absolute value of the variability 
was mall for the Same songs, a little over one semitone. 
As may be expected, males selected notes aboul an octave lower than did the 
females. The highest and lowest pitched songs were logical choices in that the 
highest average pitch was for "Joy to the World," which descends a whole octave 
in its first phrase and the lowest pitch was reserved for "Somewhere Over the 
Rainbow," whose first interval is an ascending octave. 
If humming is an adequate externalization of mental pitch, then these results 
FIG. 1.6. Mean standard de­
viations of pitch productions for 
same or different songs, both 
between or within sessions. Re­
printed from Halpern (1989). 
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point to a form of absolute pitch among ordinary people. But the use of the 
production technique has some disadvantages. Our surprisingly consistent results 
may have been partially due to the physical constraints imposed by using the 
vocal organs for a response. The gender and song differences described in the 
previous paragraph are consistent with this speculation. People may have pro­
duced only pitches that would have been acceptable if they were actually singing. 
On the other hand, perhaps stability was underestimated in subjects with poor 
singing ability. 
To complement the production paradigm, a second study used a recognition 
task that eliminated the need for a vocal response. Subjects again thought of the 
first note in the tune, but this time they searched for it on an electronic keyboard. 
Since we wanted to make sure that participants couldn't see the note they picked 
and then simply remember (or misremember) the note name, the keyboard was 
placed upside down and hidden from view. In addition, all the other precautions 
to discourage explicit memory codes were repeated from the first study. The 
disadvantage of this paradigm is that playing all those notes while hunting for the 
correct one might cause memory interference, and so the variabilities might all 
be higher in this version . Two groups of subjects participated: an unselected 
group ("general subjects") and a group of musicians. 
And indeed, the results in Fig. 1. 7 shows that average standard deviations are 
about twice as high in this version. Although the two panels of the graph look 
identical, they in fact differ statistically. The results for musicians were the same 
as those in the previous experiment: Variabilities for Same songs were smaller 
than those for Different songs, whether between or within sessions. The general 
subjects also showed this main effect of Same vs. Different song, and vari-
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FIG. 1.7. Mean standard deviations of pitch recognitions for same or 
different songs, both between or within sessions, for musicians and 
unselected subjects. Reprinted from Halpern (1989). 
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abilities were equal between and within sessions for Different songs. However, 
variabilities were significantly higher between than within sessions for Same 
songs. 
One could argue that both production and recognition tasks are uninteresting 
from a cognitive point of view because subjects were just singing the songs to 
themselves, and using muscular or other physical cues to retrieve the starting 
notes of the pieces. Several secondary results argue against that claim. In the 
production task, recall that males and females produced different pitches for the 
songs. However, in the recognition task, gender had no effect on the pitches 
selected in either group. Also, the songs given the highest and lowest starting 
pitches were not obvious choices. "We W ish You a Merry Christmas" was given 
the highest note, but it ascends in the first few notes. "The First Noel" was given 
the lowest average pitch, and it descends in the first few notes. 
Each of the two previous tasks might have favored people who are good at 
singing, or at note-finding, respectively. Even if mental representations of the 
pitches were adequate, a person with poor singing ability may have sung several 
extraneous pitches before settling on a satisfactory one in the first study. In the 
second study, a person with poor dexterity or one completely unfamiliar with 
keyboards may have played more pitches per trial before selecting the appropri­
ate one, thereby again generating more interference. Accordingly, a third experi­
ment used an initial rating task to remove any requirements for output skills in 
the main task. 
First, subjects produced preferred notes for familiar songs, as in the first 
experiment of the series. Two to five days later, they were read the name of one 
of the four stimulus songs and told to imagine the first note of that song. A tone 
was then played, and they were to rate the tone's similarity to the starting pitch 
they were imagining. The presented tones included the subject's own preferred 
pitch plus pitches one to seven semitones higher and lower in a random order. 
Trials were not blocked by song so that successive trials created the usual desired 
memory interference. Additional interference notes were played between each 
trial. Each trial was repeated once, so each datum was the average of the two 
observations. 
If subjects maintain a stable representation of starting pitch, they should rate 
their previously selected pitch as the most adequate note, and rate notes higher 
and lower as less adequate. Of secondary interest is the pattern of the remaining 
preference ratings. Krumhansl and Shephard (1979) found that two tones are 
judged to be more similar if the interval between them is considered musically 
small. For instance musical intervals of a fifth (7 semitones) and a fourth (5 
semitones) are considered more highly related by music theoreticians and by 
subjects than physically closer intervals such as a major second (2 semitones). 
Returning to the current experiment, given that the previously selected preferred 
note would be rated most highly, would the ratings of other pitches correspond to 
the musical closeness of those pitches to the preferred one? 
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Musicians and nonmusicians participated, but musical training made no dif­
ference, and so Fig. 1.8 shows combined results. 
The pattern of ratings resembles a series of peaks and valleys. Each peak was 
significantly different from the more distant of its adjacent neighbors, and the 
valleys were all different from their nearest peaks. Notice that the preferred note 
was rated highly, but so were tones 4 semitones (major third) lower, 3 semitones 
higher (minor third), and 7 semitones higher (perfect fifth), relative to the pre­
ferred note. This is interesting from a musical point of view because only the + 7 
peak is musically close to the preferred tone. So rather than solely reflecting 
musical closeness as defined by Western music theory, the pattern seems to 
reflect preference regions of pitch height. It appears that people are willing to 
pitch the entire piece up or down several semitones, but are less willing to accept 
a starting note only one or two semitones away. This suggests a quite good 
memory for the absolute pitch of the starting tone. 
These results were essentially replicated in a follow-up study that omitted 
specific imagery instructions. All subjects claimed that they played the song to 
themselves before assigning a rating. Similar to the conclusions we reached after 
analyzing the mental pitch comparison task, imagery processing appears to be a 
highly preferred strategy when answering questions about the literal aspects of 
music. 
The final study in this series returned to the question of limits on mental 
transformation of pitch, in the same way we explored the limits on tempo 
transformation earlier. If limits on such transformations exist, we should again 
see those limits being proportional to preferred pitches, rather than reflecting an 
absolute bound on imagined pitches. A recognition paradigm was employed here 
because one obviously wants to eliminate any constraints imposed by the vocal 
apparatus itself. 
As a first phase, musically unselected subjects chose preferred notes for 
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familiar songs by hunting for the preferred note on a keyboard after imagining 
the song. To elicit the highest and lowest imaginable pitch, the experimenter 
played the previously selected preferred pitch, and then began playing suc­
cessively higher (or lower) pitches in semitone increments. Half the subjects 
received each task first. As in previous paradigms, subjects rated the difficulty of 
imagining the song beginning on each presented pitch. And once again, interfer­
ing notes were played between each trial. 
As was true in the earlier recognition paradigm, males and females selected 
the same pitches in all the tasks, confirming that subvocalization mechanisms are 
insufficient to explain the results. 
Similar to the results of the tempo transformation study, highest and lowest 
imagined pitch depended on the preferred pitch (Fig. 1.9). Unfortunately, the 
pitch range over songs in this study was too narrow to show many differences 
between songs, but some information can be gained by looking at the songs 
pitched the highest ("Joy to the World") and the lowest ( "Row Row Row"). The 
preferred, highest, and lowest settings for "Joy" were all higher than any other 
song. "Row" had the lowest preferred setting, and its lowest setting was two 
semitones below that for the next lowest songs. Thus we may tentatively con­
clude that no absolute upper or lower bound exists for the range of imagined 
pitches used here. 
However, this study was the least informative of the series, and could be 
strengthened by selecting sets of songs with a wider range of preferred pitches. 
Alternatively, paradigms that don't depend on group averages would probably be 
able to maximize the chances of finding a wider range of preferred pitches. 
To summarize this section, four experiments required people of varying musi­
cal backgrounds to externalize the pitch of an imagined tune. The tunes were all 
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popular or traditional music, which had very probably been heard and performed 
at many pitch levels by the participants in their past. Considering that people 
without absolute pitch have difficulty remembering isolated tones, or tones in 
unfamiliar melodies, performance in these experiments was indicative of consid­
erable memory for an arbitrary starting pitch of familiar tunes. This claim is also 
supported by data collected by Deutsch, Kuyper, and Fisher (1987). They found 
that untrained subjects reliably and consistently perceived a musical pitch illu­
sion whose interpretation relied on some knowledge of absolute pitch. 
Although the argument in this chapter is that ordinary people store absolute 
pitch to a greater extent than is commonly believed, this should not be tak�n to
mean that everyone has a mild case of what is traditionally called absolute pitch. 
Clearly, verbal labels for notes were not used in these tasks, and consistency of 
pitch judgment was not up to the level shown by true absolute pitch possessors. 
When absolute pitch possessors make errors in pitch naming, they are frequently 
octave errors or errors of one semitone (e.g., Lockhead & Byrd, 1981). The third 
experiment showed that subjects were not inclined to equate notes separated by a 
semitone in preference ratings (although production attempts were sometimes 
only one semitone apart). 
Neuropsychological Extensions 
Within neuropsychology, some recent attention has been paid to the neuropsy­
chology of music, or the search for understanding which brain structures may 
mediate musical tasks (for reviews, see Zatorre, 1984; Peretz & Morais, 1988). 
Although some would like to believe that musical skills "live" in the right 
hemisphere as a neat analogue to language in the left, the real situation is more 
complicated than that. The most common situation for finding musical deficits 
after right hemisphere (RH) damage, usually a right temporal lobectomy, has 
tended to be in musical discrimination tasks using unfamiliar material. As noted 
earlier, this is precisely the typical paradigm used in psychomusicology experi­
ments. But one can argue that everyday musical experience more resembles the 
auditory imagery experiments I have been describing, where people recall and 
sometimes mentally manipulate a highly familiar tune. These experiments sug­
gest that people have a very rich representation of everyday tunes. 
It is this richness of representation that so far has not been examined in right 
hemisphere patients. Zatorre (1985) has shown that, like normals, RH patients 
can use the scale and contour of melodies to learn them, although they learn at a 
slower rate. But little work has explored what, if any, deficits occur in processing 
0verleamed melodies. Will the type of high-level processing required in imagery 
tasks be affected by the impaired auditory discrimination that RH patients show? 
Or can we show a dissociation between perceptual and memorial skills in music? 
Some work by Farah and associates (e.g., 1988) in the visual domain sug­
gested that perceptual and memorial skills will be related. By analyzing evoked 
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potentials in normal subjects, she has found that nearly identical brain areas are 
active in imagery and perception tasks. In brain-damaged patients, she reported 
that selective visual deficits are almost always accompanied by selective imagery 
deficits. For instance, patients who can recognize objects but not locate them in 
vision seem to show the same deficits when consulting a memory representation. 
Zatorre and I are currently exploring these possible relationships in music. As 
a first step, we had thought to repeat the higher/lower pitch experiment described 
earlier, in both imaginal and perceptual versions. We anticipated two problems in 
extending this paradigm to the epilepsy surgery patients available to us. One was 
the very high error rate in that study, which would probably only increase with a 
less educated population suffering from the effects of epilepsy, medication, sur­
gery, or all three. The second problem was that the task really requires processing 
of verbal (the lyric) and nonverbal (the imagined pitch) components. We thought 
this to be unwise if we wanted to compare left (LT) and right temporal lobe 
patients (RT), when we know that the former group has trouble with verbal 
information in general, and in retrieving the titles of familiar tunes specifically. 
To reduce the error rate, we decided to present all trials blocked by song, 
instead of randomly. Pilot subjects from this population reported that thinking of 
"Puff the Magic Dragon," "Hark the Herald Angels Sing," and then "Happy 
Birthday" in rapid succession was difficult. Another decision was to present the 
perceptual version of whatever task we chose first, so it could serve as training 
for the imagery task. To solve the second problem, we attempted to devise 
versions of the task without any verbal components. However, pilot testing with 
completely nonverbal versions of the studies showed that even normal controls 
find it very difficult to make musical decisions without the benefit of some verbal 
cue to the song. 
For our study now in progress, we reluctantly returned to a version of the 
higher/lower task that uses lyrics, but with minimal verbal memory demands. 
First, we screen subjects to make sure that they can make higher/lower judg­
ments. Then they get a low memory load or "perceptual" version of the task 
where they will see the two critical lyrics highlighted in a line of text: "DASH­
ING through the snow in a one-HORSE open sleigh .... " They simultaneously 
hear the tune being sung and decide if HORSE is higher or lower in pitch than 
DASHING. Finally, after presumably all subjects are very well trained on the 
lyrics, a true imagery task simply presents the two words DASHING and 
HORSE for judgment. Data gathered on the first small group of patients show 
that most people can at least perform these tasks at a reasonable level. 
The theoretical problem with tasks having a heavy verbal component is that 
both RT and LT patients might show deficits, but for different reasons (impair­
ment in verbal or musical skills, respectively). However, this is not a fatal flaw. 
Even if people are processing the lyrics as verbal units, the higher/lower judg­
ment requires additional access to the musical image. So we can reason that even 
if both patient groups will be impaired relative to controls, RTs should still be 
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worse than LTs on imaginal and perceptual versions if the right temporal lobe is 
"responsible" for the musical image as well as the musical percept. We will also 
be examining reaction time patterns to see if the groups vary qualitatively as well 
as quantitatively from one another. 
Now, if, contrary to prediction, we find no impairment in the patients on the 
imagery task, but do find one on the perceptual task, we would then have 
evidence for a dissociation between imagery and perception, which would be in 
interesting contrast to the results from visual imagery. This would imply that 
auditory perception and imagery differ from one another more than is the case in 
the visual domain. 
Conclusions 
Referring back to the issues raised in the Introduction, the "tune inside the head" 
is in some ways an apt description of the representation of familiar tunes. These 
tunes seem to be stored with much exact or analogue information. People appar­
ently need not rely only on such musical abstractions as contour or scale struc­
ture, as they do when processing unfamiliar tunes (Dowling, 1978). Real time 
passes while auditory images are activated, and the representations apparently 
include the fairly absolute information of tempo and pitch, in addition to the 
relative information of note and harmony relationships. 
Few differences were found in most of the studies that compared imagery and 
nonimagery instruction groups. This suggests that imagery representations are 
the usual mode of processing familiar tunes. Of course this conclusion will be 
tempered by the task asked of the subjects. Thus if I asked a subject to decide 
whether the contour of a recently learned tune was the same as the tune I now 
present, he or she might very well be able to abstract and consult just the 
contours of the two excerpts. However, if I asked someone to draw the contour of 
a familiar children's tune (try it with, say, "Old Macdonald"), I propose that the 
rich imagery representation is consulted and the contour derived from that. 
Some skills using auditory imagery are shared by musicians and nonmusicians 
alike. Both groups seem to process auditory images in real time and to perform 
judgment tasks equally quickly. Both groups showed evidence of auditory im­
ages containing pitch and tempo information. Musicians surpassed the nonmusi­
cians in maintaining that information under more difficult memory conditions.
Nonmusicians were susceptible to interference caused by the recognition foils in
the pitch experiments, and were less able than musicians to maintain stable
tempo judgments across sessions in the tempo consistency experiment. In­
terestingly, nonmusicians had more trouble overall with the tempo experiments
�han with the pitch experiments. One wonders if musical training in general
improves understanding of tempo relationships more so than pitch relationships,
an area for future research, perhaps .
Pragmatically, the analogies between visual and auditory imagery worked
26 HALPERN 
reasonably well in generating some of the research program outlined in this 
chapter. One intrinsic difficulty in comparing the modalities is the logical prob­
lem of presenting truly perceptual tasks in the auditory modality. Almost always, 
some memory component will enter into auditory comparisons. Simultaneous 
presentations of auditory stimuli are often not practical because of attentional and 
fusion effects. In the Introduction I noted that this was a methodological problem 
in that performance was likely to be worse on auditory versus visual versions of 
the imagery tasks. The theoretical problem, illustrated in the last section on 
neuropsychological extensions, is whether one can justifiably compare percep­
tual and imaginal tasks in the same way in vision and audition. I think the 
analogy cannot be strictly parallel, and the usual situation in audition will involve 
comparisons of high versus very low memory load tasks. Hopefully such com­
parisons will sometimes yield neuropsychological dissociations, so that compo­
nential analysis of auditory tasks can be made easier in future work. 
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